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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF ROY, 
A Public Agency, ) 
Plaintiff & Respondent, ) 
-vs- ) 
KEITH S. JONES and ) 
LORIS M. JONES, 
; 
Defendants & Appellants, 
Supreme Court No. 20517 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT LORIS M. JONES 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT 
COMPETENT TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND FAILING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF SIZE 
TO THE JURY. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
MOVING COSTS FOR DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS AND FAMILY. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY FEES. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 24, 1983 the Plaintiff brought action 
against Defendants to condem certain commercial real 
property belonging to Defendants and located in the 
City of Roy, Weber County, Utah. (R. 1-18). The 
property sought to be condemed was described in 
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"Exhibit A" attached to the Complaint. (R. 5 ) . The description 
was the legal description of the subject property as best 
as could be determined from the Weber County Records but 
did not close and further did not contain a statement 
as to the size of the property either in square footage 
or acreage. (R. 5). 
Prior to the filing of the Complaint, the Plaintiff 
or people acting in conjunction therewith presented to 
Defendants its offer to purchase said property, which 
offer was supported by an appraisal prepared by Lester 
S. Froerer, an appraiser of Ogden, Utah. The appraisal 
was for $150,000.00 and the offer was for $150,000.00. 
(Tr. 13, Tr. 431, Ex. 4-D, Ex. 1-D). The appraisal of 
Froerer shown as Exhibit 1-D described the subject property 
the same as in the Complaint but added that the property 
contained 1.14 acres. Also, the Weber County Records 
contained a statement that the size of the property was 
1.14 acres. 
Based upon 43,560 square feet in an acre, the appraisal 
made by Froerer and upon which the offer to purchase was 
based came to $3.02 per square foot which was rounded 
by the appraiser to $3.00 per squqare foot. (Tr. 6 ) . 
The Defendants originally planned their defense based 
upon the size of the property being 1.14 acres as represented 
by the condeming agency in its appraisal. At approximately 
4:30 to 5:00 p.m. the night before the trial the attorney 
for the Plaintiff advised counsel for Defendants that 
the property did not contain 1.14 acres. (Tr. 521, 522). 
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This revelation placed the matter of size of the 
subject property into issue. 
Mr. D. Bruce Whited, one of the engineers for 
the property owners, testified that he had calculated 
the size of the subject property at 33,129 square 
feet. (Tr. 73). Based upon this calculation Mr. 
John C. Brown, one of the Defendants1 appraisers, 
stated his ODinion of value at $6.50 per square foot 
giving a total value of $215,338.50. (Tr. 114). 
Allen Hieskanen, the Defendants' second appraiser, 
testified that in his opinion the value of the oroperty 
was $6.75 per square foot multiplying that by 33,129 
square feet giving a total value of $223,620.75 and 
subtracting $10,000.00 for demolition leaving a total 
value of $213,500.00. (Tr. 174-175). 
Jay Anderson, the engineer for the Plaintiff, 
testified that the Weber County Plats indicated a 
total size of the subject property of 36,97 5 square 
feet but that in his opinion the actual size was 
31,423 square feet. (Tr. 202). 
Lester Froerer, the original appraiser of the 
property and the Plaintiff's first witness as to 
value testified was to a value of $3.50 per square 
foot multiplying that by 31,423 square feet, thereby 
giving a total value of $109,980.50 rounded to $110,000.00. 
(Tr. 393). At this point it is to be noted that 
Froerer's original appraisal upon which the offer 
to the property owners to purchase the same was made 
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was based upon a figure of $3.00 per square foot, whereas 
he raised his opinion as to the value at trial to $3.50 
per square foot. 
Dale Jackman, the Plaintiff's second appraiser, gave 
his opinion of value at $4.25 per square foot multiplying 
that by 31,423 per square foot giving a total value of 
$133,547.75 which he rounded to $134,000.00. (Tr. 477). 
All of the appraisals presented both to the Court 
and Jury and also supporting the original offer to purchase 
were based up a per unit or square footage basis. The 
reason for this was that the property was and is commercial 
in the opinion of everyone and using a frontage foot basis 
would not be proper in view of the fact that the property 
was "pie shaped" and because of the large amount of frontage 
as opposed to depth such a method would not give a correct 
valuation. 
On rebuttal the property owners called Robert B. 
Jones, an engineer for Bush and Gudgell Inc., who had 
originally physically surveyed the subject property. (Tr. 
512). Jones was prepared to testify that the actual size 
of the subject property according to the physical survey 
was 36,871.8 square feet (Tr. 512) but the Court refused 
to allow Jones to give that figure to the Jury nor did 
the Court allow him to state how he calculated his figures. 
The Court further stated to counsel outside the hearing 
of the Jury that he and the bailif had calculated the 
size and then advised the Jury that they were to consider 
the property as being 31,000 to 32,000 square feet in 
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size although admittedly it is difficult from the 
record what the Court advised the Jury in this regard. 
The important point is that the Court refused to 
allow Jones to tell the Jury how he calculated size 
and give his opinion as to size although he was probably 
the most competent witness of all in this regard. 
Also, the Court failed to submit the issue of size 
to the Jury. 
The result of all this was that the case was 
presented to the Jury with valuations running from 
$3.50 per square foot to $6.75 per square foot and 
opinions as to size running from 33,129 to 31,423 
square feet with the Court telling the Jury they 
could consider size from 31,000 to 32,000 square 
feet and the Court refusing to let the Jury hear 
an opinion as to size of 36,871.8 square feet although 
the latter was probably the best evidence of all. 
The Jury's verdict was $128,000.00 for the value 
of the property taken. (R. 113). Based upon a square 
footage of 33,129 the award would be $3.86 per square 
foot and if the correct figure for the size was 31,423 
the award would be $4.07 per square foot. Which 
ever figure is used the Jury!s award exceeded the 
original offer of $3.00 per square foot. 
The property owners were entitled to moving 
expenses under Section 11-19-23.9 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended. The Plaintiff was acting under 
authority of Title 11, Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated. 
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The Court allowed the Defendants to present evidence as 
to moving expenses for Loris M. Jones but refused to allow 
her to present moving expenses to her sons. (Tr. 339). 
The property was being used as a trailer park and her 
sons had trailer houses on it as well as Mrs. Jones. Ihe Jury 
awarded moving expenses of $18,300.00 to Mrs. Jones only 
under the terms of the Court's ruling and instructions. 
Subsequent to trial the Defendants filed a Motion 
for Order Setting Attorney Fees pursuant to Section 11-
19-23.9 Utah Code Annotated 1953. This motion was based 
upon the fact that the Juryfs verdict based upon a square 
footage basis was in excess of that of the original offer. 
The Court overruled and denied Defendants' motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When it became apparent that the parties could not 
agree on the size of the subject property, the issue as 
to the size became a Jury issue. All the appraisers, 
including the original appraiser and his original appraisal 
approached the matter by setting a per square foot value 
on the property and by then multiplying out that figure 
by their understanding as to the number of square feet. 
It was improper for the Court to arrive at its own opinion 
as to the size when the experts disagreed on it and it 
was further improper for the Court not to submit the issue 
as to size to the Jury after allowing all qualified testimony 
before the Jury as to size including that of Robert Jones 
who was the most competent of all to testify as to size. 
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The subject property had several trailer houses 
on it that had to be moved when the Plaintiff took 
the property. Two of the trailers belonged to Defendants1 
sons. The Court should have allowed moving costs 
for all of the trailers including the parties' sons1 
trailers. 
The final award to the Defendants made by the 
Jury was in excess of the Plaintiff's original offer 
taking into account the adjustment for size. As 
a result under the statute the Defendants were entitled 
to attorneys fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT 
COMPETENT TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND FAILING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF SIZE 
TO THE JURY. 
The right to trial by Jury is a fundamental 
right in our Democratic system. Art. I, Section 
10, Const, of Utah; 78-21-1, UCA 1953. If the action 
involved is at Law all issues will be tried by a 
Jury if either party demands one. Babcock V. Dangerfield 
98 Utah 10, 94 P. 2d 862. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Ut. 
2d 11, 327 P. 2d 250; Rule 39, URCP. 
Generally speaking, a Jury trial is a proceeding 
in which the Jury are the judges of fact and the 
Courts are the judges of the Law. The right to Jury Trial 
means that the ultimate determination of issues of 
fact is to be by the Jury under proper guidance and 
direction of the Court. 47 Am Jur 2d 637. 
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The right to trial by jury only arises where there 
disputed facts or where different inferences may be drawn 
from the undisputed facts. Preston v. Denkins 94 Ariz. 
214, 382 P. 2d 686. The right extends to all issues of 
fact in civil actions at law. Thomas v. American Freehold 
Land & Mortgage, 47 F. 550. 
In this case the ultimate issue of fact was the total 
value of the property. In reaching this conclusion the 
trier of fact had to determine firstly, the size of the 
subject property and secondly, the value of the property 
on a unit basis, in this case per square foot. The reason 
the square square footage size of the property was so 
important is because all of the appraisers based their 
appraisals on a square footage basis. As a result it 
was critical that a proper determination of the number 
of square feet in the subject property be determined. 
Compounding the Court's error in failing to submit 
the issue of size to the Jury was the Court's refusal 
to allow Mr. Jones to testify as to his opinion as to 
size. It will be recalled that Jones was the only engineer 
available to testify that had actually physically surveyed 
the property. The other engineers had only taken the 
legal description and attmepted to calculate size from 
it. All parties testified that the legal description 
was faulty and failed to "close". 
The Court further misled the Jury in that it attempted 
to take "Judicial Notice" of the rules of mathematics 
and it and its bailif, through some process known only 
8 
to them, arrived at a size of between 31,000 and 
32,000 square feet and so told the Jury. While ordinarily, 
I suppose, the Courts can properly take Judicial 
Notice of simple mathematical calculations, in this 
case not only did the description not close but other 
problems existed that required the experts to make 
certain assumptions that only a qualified expert 
could make. As a result Court erred in making the 
calculations and advising the Jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW MOVING 
COSTS FOR DEFENDANTS1 BUSINESS AND FAMILY. 
Section 11-19-23.9 UCA 1953 authorizes granting 
moving or relocating expenses when "Relocating the 
owner whose property is acquired or a party conducting 
a business on such acquired property". Loris M. 
Jones, one of the owners was allowed moving expenses 
but such expenses were refused for moving the remainder 
of the trailers on the property or those oC Defendants' 
sons. 
Section 202 (a) of the Uniform Relocation Assistance 
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 
which apparently has not been enacted into lav/ in 
Utah, specifically authorized: 
"(1) actual reasonable expenses in moving himself 
(the property owner) his family, business, farm 
operation or other personal property". 4A Nichols 
on Eminent Domain, Section 14.2471 (4). 
Thus, there is authority for allowing expenses 
for all costs of moving, no matter what they may 
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be and not just having them limited to the property owner 
himself. 
The Constitution requires that when a persons' property 
is taken, the personel involved shall be paid "just compen-
sation". It seems only reasonable that if a statute allows 
moving expenses to the "owner" of the property taken that 
would include compensation for the owner's family also. 
In addition, the statute itself authorizes business moving 
expenses. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANTS1 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
Section 11-19-23.9 UCA 1953 as amended authorizes 
attorneys fees if the "amount of the award exceeds the 
amount offered." The original offer of the Plaintiff, 
based upon a size of 1.14 acres, was $150,000.00 or $3.02 
per square foot. Because of the subsequent discovery 
that the subject property was less than that in size, 
although the size was not exactly determined, the total 
purchase price would be reduced. Such reduction, however, 
would make no effect on the per unit or per square foot 
value of the property. 
The lowest value per square foot testified to at 
trial by any appraiser was $3.50 per square foot. Depending 
on which square footage figure the Jury used the award 
came in any where from $3.80 per square foot to $4.07 
per square foot. As a result, the award exceeded the 
amount offered therefore entitling the Defendants to 
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Phillip L. Foremaster testified that he was 
entitled to $12,000.00 in attorney fees. (Tr. April 
30, 1984, page 23). George B. Handy testified he 
was entitled to attorneys fees of $10,000.00. No 
serious issue was raised as to the reasonableness 
of these fees. 
The Court refused to grant attorneys fees although 
the same were authorized under statute. In volume 
4A of Nichols on Eminent Domain at Section 14.249 
(4) the following statement is contained: 
"The Constitution requires that private property 
shall not be taken for public use, except on 
the payment of just compensation and a man who 
is forced into Court where he owes no obligation 
to the party moving against him, cannot be said 
to have received just compensation for his property 
if he is put into an expense appreciably important 
to establish the value of his property. He 
does not want to sell; the property is taken 
from him through the exercises of the high powers 
of the state, and the spirit of the constitution 
clearly requires that he shall not be compelled 
to part with what belongs to him without the 
payment, not alone of the abstract value of 
the property, but of all the necessary expenses 
incurred in fixing that value". 
The Defendants v/ere entitled to attorney fees. 
As no contrary testimony is in the record the fees 
awarded should be as testified to by counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant the 'following relief: 
1. Order a new trial with instructions to the 
Trial Court to allow all competent witnesses to testify, 
to allow evidence as to proper moving expenses and 
to allow attorneys fees with the further requirement 
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that all issues of fact be submitted to the Jury. 
2. In the event the Court does not see fit to Order 
new trial then it should Order an additur raising the 
amount of the award for damages for the taking of the 
subject property to the sum of $150,000.00, the Plaintiff's 
original offer, plus add on $22,000.00 in attorneys fees 
and then give the Plaintiff the option of whether to accept 
the auditur or take a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
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